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NOTES & COMMENTS
THE NEED FOR A WORLDWIDE DRAFT:
MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL AND ITS
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE CUBAN EMBARGO
AND UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
I. INTRODUCTION
A favorite saying in Cuba is "todos los nifios nacen con un guante en
sus manos," which means, "all boys are born with a baseball glove in their
hands."' Incredibly, at least ten percent of all Cubans play baseball in
some type of organized league.2 Before the establishment of the Cuban
embargo,3 approximately 110 Cuban baseball players played Major League
Baseball in the United States.4 In 1991, Rene Arocha was the first Cuban
baseball player to defect to the U.S. since the Communists took power in
Cuba in 1959. 5 When asked about the baseball talent in Cuba, Arocha
stated all twenty players on the Cuban national team, as well as several
others, could successfully play in Major League Baseball ("MLB").
6
However, for approximately thirty-eight years this talent pool has been
unavailable to MLB teams because of the Cuban embargo and MLB rules.7
1. Kevin Baxter & Fernando Dominguez, Baseball Si, Cuba No, SPORTING NEWS, Mar. 21,
1994, at 12, 12.
2. See id.
3. See infra Part III.
4. See Baxter & Dominguez, supra note 1, at 14. Cuban players such as Minnie Minoso,
Camilo Pascual, Dolph Luque, and Pedro Ramos played in the Major Leagues before Castro
banned professional sports in 1960. See id.
5. See Steven Wulf, Rene Arocha, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Apr. 19, 1993, at 60, 60.
6. See Baxter & Dominguez, supra note 1, at 14. The talent level in Cuba is believed to be
four players deep at each position. See id.
7. See Proclamation No. 3447, 3 C.F.R. 26 (Supp. 1962), reprinted in 22 U.S.C. § 2370
(1994). See generally Steve Fainaru, LA Loses Minor Leaguers: Dodgers Punished for Holding
Secret Tryouts, BOSTON GLOBE, June 28, 1999, at Dl. MLB rules prohibit teams from scouting
in Cuba. See id.
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The obvious desire of MLB teams to obtain this talent, coupled with Cuban
players' desire for "liberty," have resulted in defections from Cuba.8
In June of 1999, the Los Angeles Dodgers became the first baseball
team caught scouting in Cuba, a violation of MLB rules.9 As a result of
this violation, the Los Angeles Dodgers lost their contractual rights to two
Cuban-born minor league players, Josue Perez and Juan Carlos Diaz.l0 The
Dodgers were also fined $200,000.'1 The Dodgers helped the players
defect to the Dominican Republic, which, under MLB rules, allowed the
Cubans to sign as free agents with the Dodgers.' 2 If the Cubans had come
directly to the U.S., either on their own or with illegal help from the
Dodgers, the two players would have been subject to the amateur draft.'"
They would have then been available to any MLB team with a higher draft
pick than the Dodgers and all of the Dodgers' covert actions would have
been for naught.14 This exemplifies how the current MLB rules encouraged
the Dodgers to violate the embargo just to contract a player.
This Comment argues MLB rules must be changed in order to avoid
giving teams an incentive to violate U.S. foreign policy. Part II discusses
the Dodgers' unprecedented actions in Cuba and examines the details of the
first time a major league team scouted in Cuba in direct contravention of
Major League rules. Part III focuses on the Cuban Embargo, specifically
the history of the embargo and its recent developments. Part IV discusses
whether the Dodgers could be charged with violating the federal embargo
implementing provisions. Part V examines the evolution of MLB rules
regarding the recruiting and signing of Cuban players. In addition, Part V
shows how the "loophole"' 5 in MLB rules encourages teams to violate the
Cuban embargo and encourages agents to disrupt foreign relations between
8. See Baxter & Dominguez, supra note 1, at 13. When describing why he left Cuba, Rene
Arocha explained the main reason he left was to "look for liberty." Id. Alexis Cabreja defected
in 1992 and stated "[his] main objective, above all, [was] to have the liberty [that he] didn't have
[in Cuba] to play baseball...." Id. Other factors prompting defection include the weak Cuban
economy and the inspiration prior defectors have given to players still in Cuba. See id.
9. See Fainaru, supra note 7.
10. See id.
11. See Hal Bodley, Selig's Signing Ban Punishes Dodgers, USA TODAY, July 2, 1999, at
8C.
12. See Fainaru, supra note 7.
13. See infra Part V.B. 1-2; see also infra notes 239-40 and accompanying text.
14. See infra Part V.B. 1-2; see also infra notes 239-40 and accompanying text.
15. See Kevin Baxter, Throwing Cuban Players a Lifelines, SPORTING NEWS, Aug. 10,
1998, at 18, 20. Cuban players who defect, not directly into the United States, but for example,
into the Dominican Republic and set up residency there, become free agents under MLB rules.
See generally David Beard, "El Duque, " Friends Get Visas, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale),
Jan. 7, 1998, at 12A [hereinafter Friends Get Visas].
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Cuba and the U.S., Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic and the
Bahamas. 16 Finally, Part VI describes recent legislative and presidential
action regarding the U.S. embargo against Cuba and how this could affect
MLB and its rules. This part also suggests changes to MLB rules that may
avoid another incident similar to that created by the Dodgers.
II. THE DODGERS RECRUITMENT IN CUBA VIOLATED MAJOR LEAGUE
BASEBALL RULES
In 1999, for the first time, MLB granted free agency to two of the Los
Angeles Dodgers' minor league baseball players to penalize the Dodgers
for scouting in Cuba.' 7 Never before had a MLB team been caught
scouting in Cuba.' 8 First baseman Juan Carlos Diaz and outfielder Josue
Perez disclosed the Dodgers held secret tryouts in Cuba and arranged their
defections in violation of MLB rules. 19 Pablo Peguero, an official scout of
the Dodgers' baseball academy in the Dominican Republic, held the tryouts
when he traveled to Cuba in 1996 and 1997 pretending to be a tourist.
20
During these two trips, Peguero met with numerous Cuban players,
including Diaz and Perez.2'
When disclosing the Dodgers' illegal actions, Diaz told the MLB
Commissioner's Office that Peguero had videotaped Diaz in a tryout
outside of Havana, Cuba in 1996.22 Perez reported he tried out for Peguero
in Cuba in 1997.23 Peguero allegedly implemented a plan, for both Diaz
and Perez, whereby the players could obtain visas to leave Cuba for the
Dominican Republic.24 Under the plan, two women, one of whom was
Peguero's cousin, posed as the players' girlfriends from the Dominican
16. See Baxter, supra note 15, at 21. Osvaldo Fernandez defected with sports agent Joe
Cubas' help in 1995. See id. at 20. Furthermore, Fernandez's family also left Cuba, but
Fernandez will not disclose how. See id.
17. See Fainaru, supra note 7. The Dodgers lost all contractual rights to the professional
services of Diaz and Perez, as well as time and money invested in improving these players' skills.
See id. These players, as free agents, were allowed to negotiate with other Major League teams
for their services. See id.; see also Joe Christensen, Dodgers Lose Two Cubans; MLB Says the
Team Violated Rules Prohibiting Scouting Players in the Country, PRESs-ENTERPRISE (Riverside,
Cal.), June 29, 1999, at Cl, available in 1999 WL 18895090.
18. See Fainaru, supra note 7.
19. See id.; see also Christensen, supra note 17.




24. See Christensen, supra note 17.
2000]
394 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol.20:391
Republic. The "girlfriends" lied by insisting to Cuban immigration
officials they had invited Diaz and Perez to visit the Dominican Republic.
26
The plan worked, and Diaz and Perez were authorized to travel to the
Dominican Republic.27 Moreover, after helping them obtain the visas,
Peguero apparently purchased airline tickets to the Dominican Republic for
the players.28
Once the two players were in the Dominican Republic, the two
women disappeared 29 and the players were placed into Campo Las Palmas
Baseball Camp, the Dodgers Dominican baseball academy.30 Without prior
negotiations and without the players having an opportunity to be
represented by agents, Peguero signed the players to free agent baseball
contracts. 3 1 Diaz signed for $65,000 while Perez signed for $40,000.32 The
players were then told to lie about their background.33 If asked how they
came to the Dominican Republic, the players were to respond that they
were in fact born in Cuba but had traveled to the Dominican Republic with
their girlfriends.34
After this incident was revealed, the Commissioner's office fined the
Dodgers $200,000, $50,000 less than the maximum allowable fine. 35 The
office also restricted the Dodgers from signing any foreign player for six
months as a result of their conduct.
36
Although these violations occurred in 1996 and 1997,37 they were not
exposed until almost two years later, when Diaz and Perez discovered their
signing bonuses were significantly lower than the millions of dollars other
Cuban players were making in MLB.38 Diaz and Perez were further
25. See Fainaru, supra note 7.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See Bill Plaschke, Liberty-and Justice-for All, L.A. TIMES, June 30, 1999, at Dl.
29. See Fainaru, supra note 7.
30. See Plaschke, supra note 28.
31. See Fainaru, supra note 7.
32. See id.
33. See Plsaschke, supra note 28.
34. See id.
35. See Bodley, supra note 11.
36. See Thumbs Down, SEATrLE TiMES, July 11, 1999, at D9; see also Bodley, supra note
11. There was an exception for two players with whom the Dodgers were negotiating at the time.
See id.
37. See Fainaru, supra note 7.
38. See Christensen, supra note 17. Dominguez, now the agent for the two players, believes
the Dodgers took advantage of the Cuban players: "[The Dodgers] thought that they were bigger
than baseball, and they're not." Id.; see also Baxter, supra note 15, at 19. Orlando Hernandez, a
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disillusioned by the fact the Dodgers had told the two players the franchise
would help their families defect, but this never occurred.39
III. THE CUBAN EMBARGO
The U.S. implemented the initial stages of the Cuban embargo in
1962.40 Throughout the thirty-eight years it has been in place, the embargo
has undergone considerable modification. As it stands today,
"persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,"
meaning not only persons in the United States and American
citizens, but also entities anywhere that are controlled by
American persons, are prohibited from engaging in virtually all
types of transactions with Cuba unless they have received a
specific license from the U.S. Treasury Department's Office of
the Foreign Assets Control.4'
A. Early Origins of the Cuban Embargo
The Cuban embargo is based upon the Trading With the Enemy Act
("TWEA"),42 implemented in 1917. The TWEA was a "war measure"
promulgated six months after the U.S. entered into World War 1.43 Section
5(b) of the TWEA stated the President of the U.S. may, by means of
instructions, licenses, or otherwise:
investigate, regulate,... prevent or prohibit, any acquisition
holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation,
importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any
right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions
involving, any property in which any foreign country or a
national thereof has any interest, by any person, or with respect
recent Cuban baseball player who defected in 1998, negotiated a $6.6 million dollar contract with
the New York Yankees. See id. at 18.
39. See Plaschke, supra note 28.
40. See Proclamation No. 3447, 3 C.F.R. 26 (Supp. 1962), reprinted in 22 U.S.C. § 2370
(1994). President Kennedy stated the purpose of the embargo was to ensure safety in the western
hemisphere by "isolating the present Government of Cuba and thereby reducing the threat posed
by its alignment with the communist powers." Id.
41. Lynn R. Coleman & Thomas R. Graham, The Stars and Stripes Wherever: The Impact
of Unilateral U.S. Economic Sanctions on the International Petroleum Industiy, 35 ALTA. L.
REv. 334, 338 (1996).
42. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (1994).
43. See Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 226 n.2 (1984).
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to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States.... 44
The text of the TWEA originally stated it was also applicable
"[d]uring... any... period of national emergency declared by the
President. 45  This language gave the President the authority to impose
embargoes against foreign countries, regardless of whether or not there was
a wartime emergency.4
Section 5(b) gives authority to the President, or his designee, to
control all transactions between the U.S. and any nation under the aim of
the TWEA.47 The Secretary of the Treasury is given the authority to
promulgate regulations with the goal of enforcing the TWEA.48 Under the
authority of the Secretary of the Treasury, the Office of Foreign Assets
Control ("OFAC") implements and enforces the Cuban Assets Control
Regulations ("CACR").49 In 1963, the OFAC codified the embargo that
previously had been implemented under the TWEA.50 The codified CACR
also included new economic sanctions on Cuba.5' The goals underlying the
TWEA and the CACR are:
(1) to deny to Cuba or its nationals hard currency which might
be used to promote activities inimical to the interests of the
United States; (2) to retain blocked funds for possible use to
settle claims against the Cuban government, or to vest to the
United States if necessary; and (3) to use blocked funds for
negotiation purposes in discussions with the Cuban
government.52
Federal regulations promulgated to achieve these goals,
"prohibit[] ... the transfer, sale or other disposition of assets in which the
Cuban government or Cuban nationals have an interest. 5 3 Furthermore,
any transfer that violates the CACR is "null and void. 54  Under the
44. 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b)(1)(B) (1994).
45. United States v. Femandez-Pertierra, 523 F. Supp. 1135, 1137 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
46. See Regan, 468 U.S. at 225-26.
47. See Fernandez-Pertierra, 523 F. Supp. at 1137.
48. See 31 C.F.R. § 515.802 (1999).
49. See id.; see also Havana Club Holding v. Galleon, 961 F. Supp. 498, 500 (S.D.N.Y.
1997).
50. See Havana Club Holding, 961 F. Supp. at 500 (stating the original embargo was a U.S.
response to "alleged Cuban efforts to destabilize Latin American Governments").
51. See Regan, 468 U.S. at 226 n.4.
52. Miranda v. Secretary of the Treasury, 766 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1985) (citing Real v.
Simon, 510 F.2d 557, 563 (5th Cir. 1975), reh'g denied, 514 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1975)).
53. Miranda, 766 F.2d at 4 (citing 31 C.F.R. § 515.201 (1984)).
54. 31 C.F.R. § 515.203(a) (1999).
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TWEA, the U.S. may criminally prosecute anyone who violates the TWEA
or the CACR. 55
Alternative authority granted to the President for the implementation
of the CACR is found in the Foreign Assistance Act ("FAA"),56 which
declares a broad embargo on all trade with Cuba. 7 The FAA also states
that no aid may be given to the government of Cuba5 8 and gives the
President the authority to "establish and maintain" an embargo between the
U.S. and Cuba.59
Section 5(b) of the TWEA was amended on December 28, 1977, in
order to limit the President's TWEA authority to times of war.60 The same
bill developed the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
("IEEPA").6' The IEEPA continued the President's exercise of emergency
economic powers during times of peace.62 However, instead of requiring
the President to declare a new national emergency against Cuba, the
amendment to the TWEA retroactively carried over those peacetime
"national emergency" authorities to the President that he was exercising
with respect to Cuba on July 1, 1977, under § 5(b) of the TWEA.63 The
amendment also provided "[tlhe President may extend the exercise of such
authorities for one-year periods upon determination for each such extension
that the exercise of such authorities with respect to [Cuba] for another year
is in the national interest of the United States." 64 Therefore, the CACR
were not affected by the 1977 amendment and the embargo remained in
force.65
55. See Fernandez-Pertierra, 523 F. Supp. at 1138.
56. 22 U.S.C. § 2370 (1994) (the References in Text section indicates this Act is the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424 (1961)).
57. See id. § 2370(a)(1).
58. See id. ("No assistance shall be furnished under this chapter to the present government
of Cuba.").
59. See id. ("As an additional means of implementing and carrying into effect the policy...
the President is authorized to establish and maintain a total embargo upon all trade between the
United States and Cuba.").
60. See Trading With the Enemy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-223, § 101, 91 Stat. 1625 (1977)
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b)(1) (1994)).
61. See International Emergency Economic Powers Act, Pub. L. No. 95-223, § 201, 91 Stat.
1626 (1977) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1994)).
62. See id. Although through the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
("IEEPA") the President retains his peacetime power, it can only be used, "to deal with [an]
unusual and extraordinary threat." See 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a). The President, though, is required to
consult with Congress before exercising his power under the JEEPA. See 50 U.S.C. § 1703.
63. See Trading With the Enemy Act, § 101(b), 91 Stat. at 1625 (codified at 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 5 note (1994)).
64. Id.
65. See Fernandez-Pertierra, 523 F. Supp. at 1138.
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B. Recent Developments of the Cuban Embargo
The Cuban Democracy Act of 19926 modified the existing sanctions
under the Cuban embargo.67  The Cuban Democracy Act extends the
prohibition against doing business in Cuba to U.S.-owned or controlled
companies located abroad.68 Under the Act, no licenses may be issued to
American firms for listed transactions involving the exportation and
importation of goods of Cuban origin.6 9 Congress gave responsibility for
enforcement of the Cuban Democracy Act to the Secretary of the Treasury,
reaffirming the secretary's role in the implementation of the Cuban
embargo. 70  Another important provision allows the President to sanction
any foreign country that assists Cuba.7 1
Most recently, the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of
1996,72 also known as the Helms-Burton Act,73 further extended the reach
of the embargo. 74 The Helms-Burton Act requires the Cuban government
adhere to specific conditions and the President receive Congressional
approval before the U.S. President may lift the embargo.75  The Helms-
Burton Act continues the embargo indefinitely by maintaining all of the
CACR restrictions until a democratically-elected government is in power in
66. 22 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6010 (1994).
67. See Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 58 Fed. Reg. 34,709 (1993) (codified at 31
C.F.R. § 515 (1999)).
68. See 22 U.S.C. § 6005 (permitting the issuance of specific licenses to a limited number of
U.S. companies for transactions described in 31 C.F.R. § 515.559 (1999)).
69. See 31 C.F.R. § 515.559.
70. See 22 U.S.C. § 6009.
71. See 22 U.S.C. § 6003. Section 6003 allows the President to bar a country's eligibility
for aid from the U.S. under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 or the Arms Export Control Act,
if that country provides assistance to Cuba. See id. Furthermore, any country that assists Cuba
"shall not be eligible, under any program, for forgiveness or reduction of debt owed to the United
States Government." Id. Assistance is defined as financial assistance and does not include the
donation of food or the exportation of medicine. See id. § 6003(b)(2).
72. 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-6024, 6031-6046, 6061-6067, 6081-6085, 6091 (Supp. 1I 1998).
73. See Coleman & Graham, supra note 41, at 338. The act is often referred to by the
names of its two principal sponsors, Senator Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) and Representative Dan
Burton (R-Ind.). See id.
74. See 22 U.S.C. § 6032(h) (Supp. III 1998) (amending the economic embargo against
Cuba yet keeping the economic embargo in effect on March 1, 1996, as well as all the restrictions
under 31 C.F.R. § 515 (1999)). Congress passed the Helms-Burton Act to toughen the embargo
after the Cuban military shot down two civilian aircraft in 1996. See 22 U.S.C. § 6046
(condemning Cuban attack on American aircraft); see also Tim Golden, U.S., Avoiding Castro,
Relaxes Rules on Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 1999, at Al.
75. See generally 22 U.S.C. §§ 6061-6066. Such requirements include Cuban legalization
of all political activity and organization of free and fair elections. See id. § 6065. Congressional
approval must be by joint resolution of the two houses of Congress. See 22 U.S.C. § 6064.
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Cuba.76 This provision dispenses with the TWEA amendment requiring the
President to declare each year the embargo is in the nation's interest.77
Thus, the Helms-Burton Act shifts the power to Congress to modify or lift
the embargo, a power that previously resided with the President.78
C. The Power of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations
The CACR effectively control who may travel to Cuba. 79 The OFAC,
which promulgates the CACR, has broad discretion in deciding when to
issue specific licenses that authorize otherwise prohibited transactions or
travel.80 The CACR also codify OFAC's authority both to make changes to
the CACR licensing regulations and to amend or rescind existing licenses
at any time.8' Courts interpret the regulations with great deference to the
President and OFAC's decisions to deny American citizens the right to
travel to Cuba.
8 2
In Regan v. Wald,8 3 American citizens challenged a provision of the
CACR8 4 as violative of their Constitutional Fifth Amendment due process
right to travel.85 Although the 1977 amendment to the TWEA limited the
statute to war-time application, the amendment "grandfathered" those
powers that the President was exercising at the time of the amendment's
passage, July 1, 1977.86 The Supreme Court held the "grandfather"
provision, when read in conjunction with the TWEA, provided sufficient
statutory authority for the President to regulate travel to and from Cuba.87
76. See 22 U.S.C. § 6032(h).
77. See Coleman & Graham, supra note 41, at 339.
78. See id.
79. See generally 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.560-515.574 (1999).
80. See Havana Club Holding, 961 F. Supp. at 500-01 (describing the effect of 31 C.F.R. §
515.801(b)(6)).
81. See Havana Club Holding, 961 F. Supp. at 501 (describing OFAC's authority pursuant
to 31 C.F.R. § 515.805).
82. See, e.g., Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 242 (1984) (upholding the President's authority
to restrict travel to Cuba over a Fifth Amendment claim); Walsh v. Brady, 927 F.2d 1229, 1239
(D.C. Cir. 1991) (upholding the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury to deny a license to
travel to Cuba if reasonable when considered in light of foreign policy concerns).
83. 468 U.S. 222.
84. The provision challenged was 31 C.F.R. § 515.560(g) (1999) (proscribing transactions
involving tourist travel to Cuba).
85. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
86. See Trading With the Enemy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-223, § 101, 91 Stat. 1625 (1977)
(codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b)(1) (1994)).
87. See Regan, 468 U.S. at 232, 235.
Since the authority to regulate travel-related transactions was among those
"authorities conferred upon the President" by §5(b) of the TWEA "which were
2000]
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The Wald Court addressed the due process argument next.88 Relying
on an earlier case, Zemel v. Rusk,89 the Wald Court concluded the denial of
the right to travel to Cuba was justified "by weighty concerns of foreign
policy." 90 In Zemel, the Court upheld the Secretary of State's refusal to
validate passports of American citizens who wished to travel to Cuba.91
This refusal worked to impose a general ban on travel to Cuba in 1961.91
In Zemel, the plaintiffs alleged both First Amendment and Fifth
Amendment violations. 93 Although the Zemel Court agreed the Secretary's
decision not to issue passports for travel to Cuba resulted in a fettered flow
of information,94 the Court found the First Amendment does not confer the
unbridled right to freely gather information.95 The Wald Court held the
considerations underlying the Fifth Amendment right to travel did not
trump the foreign policy concerns in preventing travel to Cuba. 96 Based on
the Court's approval of the CACR in Wald, OFAC can constitutionally
impose broad restrictions on travel to Cuba.
97
The CACR restrict "travel-related transactions to, from, and within
Cuba... by persons subject to United States jurisdiction." 98 However, the
CACR do allow persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction to 'obtain general
licenses to travel to Cuba for family visits,99 official business of "the U.S.
government, foreign governments, ... certain intergovernmental
organizations,"' 00 "journalistic activities"
101 or "professional research."' 0 2
All other travel activities require a specific license that must be obtained
being exercised" with respect to Cuba on July 1, 1977, it seems to us to follow from
a natural reading of the grandfather clause that the authority to regulate such
transactions "may continue to be exercised" with respect to Cuba after that date.
Id. at 235 (citing Trading With the Enemy Act, § 101(b), 91 Stat. at 1625 (codified at 50 U.S.C.
app. § 5 note (1994)).
88. See Regan, 468 U.S. at 240.
89. 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
90. Regan, 468 U.S. at 242.
91. See Zemel, 381 U.S. at 3.
92. See id.
93. See id. at 16.
94. See id.
95. See id. at 17.
96. See Regan, 468 U.S. at 242. The Court explained, "[w]e see no reason to differentiate
the travel restrictions imposed by the President in the present case and the passport restrictions
imposed by the Secretary of State in Zemel." Id.
97. See id. at 244; see also supra notes 82-92 and accompanying text.
98. 31 C.F.R. § 515.560(e) (1999).
99. Id. § 515.561.
100. Id. § 515.562.
101. Id. § 515.563.
102. Id. § 515.564.
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through OFAC, which evaluates travel inquiries on a case-by-case basis. 10 3
Specific licenses to travel to Cuba may be available for the following:
"educational activities,"'04 "religious activities,"' 0 "public performances..
[including]... athletic and other competitions,"'' 0 6 "support of the Cuban
people"'0 7 and "humanitarian projects.' 08
IV. THE LOS ANGELES DODGERS VIOLATED THE CUBAN EMBARGO
The Dodgers' scouting activities in Cuba are among the types of
actions regulated by the CACR.'09 Evidence exists that the Dodgers'
violations included both traveling to Cuba to scout and making contacts
with individual Cuban baseball players.' 10
A. Peguero Violated the Cuban Embargo
The CACR provide for specific situations where a general license for
travel to Cuba will be issued."' Any other travel requires the application
for, and grant of, a specific license."12 Most importantly, the regulations
expressly prohibit the issuance of a specific or general license to a person
subject to U.S. jurisdiction" 3 for tourist travel to Cuba." 4 Pablo Peguero,
103. See id. § 515.560(b) (1999).
104. 31 C.F.R. § 515.565.
105. Id. § 515.566.
106. Id. § 515.567.
107. Id. § 515.574.
108. Id. § 515.575 (1999). These activities are not the only ones for which a specific license
can be obtained. See generally id. §§ 515.565-515.575.
109. See generally 31 C.F.R. § 515.201 (1999).
110. See Fainaru, supra note 7. The Cuban players Diaz and Perez cannot be charged with
violating the Cuban embargo because the embargo applies only to "United States persons." 22
U.S.C. § 6010 (1994). A "United States person" includes "any United States citizen or alien
admitted for permanent residence in the United States." Id.
111. See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 104-08 and accompanying text.
113. See 31 C.F.R. § 515.329 (1999). The phrase "[pl]ersons subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States" includes any individual, wherever located, who is a citizen or resident of the
United States. See id. Moreover, § 515.329(c)-(d) (1999) defines "persons subject to jurisdiction
of the United States" as including a corporation organized under the laws of the U.S., as well as a
corporation that is controlled by a U.S. resident or citizen. See id. § 515.329(c)-(d). Therefore, if
Peguero was not himself a resident or citizen of the U.S., he is an agent acting on behalf of a U.S.
corporation, which defined under the CACR is a "person subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States." See id. § 515.329(c)-(d).
114. See id. § 515.560(g) (1999).
Nothing in this section authorizes transactions in connection with tourist travel to
Cuba, nor does it authorize transactions in relation to any business travel, including
making or agreeing to make any investment in Cuba, establishing or agreeing to
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an official with the Dodgers' baseball academy in the Dominican Republic,
entered Cuba as a tourist.'15 As such, Peguero was not eligible for either a
general license or a specific license."
16
The professional research exception of the CACR also does not
protect Peguero's travel to Cuba. 1 7 Under this exception, only a full-time
professional traveling to Cuba for professional research is eligible for a
general license." 8 Furthermore, the research must be of a "noncommercial,
academic nature. ' " 9 Peguero's presence in Cuba was for the sole purpose
of signing Cuban players,' 20 a purely economic activity. Thus, Peguero's
activities do not fit under this research exception and his unauthorized
travel to Cuba violated the license regulations.' 2 ' However, it is unclear
whether Peguero violated the CACR, and § 515.415 specifically which
prohibits transactions in connection with transportation of any Cuban
national from Cuba to the U.S.1 22  It is also unclear whether Peguero
violated the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992.123
Peguero may be guilty of assisting a Cuban national to travel from
Cuba to the U.S. without a visa. 124 Section 515.415 of the CACR prohibits
"transactions incident to travel to, from, or within Cuba,"'125 as well as the
"payment of port fees, ... fuels, meals, [and] lodging."' 126 Also prohibited
are the "receipt or acceptance of any gratuity, grant, or support in the form
of meals, lodging, fuel, payments of travel or maintenance expenses, or
establish any branch or agency in Cuba, or transferring or agreeing to transfer any
property to Cuba, except transfers by or on behalf of individual or group travelers
authorized pursuant to his part.
Id.
115. See Fainaru, supra note 7. "An estimated 24,000 Americans will travel illegally to
Cuba each year through flights out of Jamaica, Mexico, and the Bahamas" for tourism alone. See
All Aboard the Flight to Havana, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 5, 1999 (located in Chicago Sports Final
Edition at 20).
116. See supra notes 99-102, 104-08 and accompanying text.
117. See 31 C.F.R. § 515.564(1999).
118. See id.
119. Id. (stating issuance of a general license requires the research (i) be of a
noncommercial, academic nature; (ii) comprise a full work schedule in Cuba; (iii) have a
substantial likelihood of public dissemination; and (iv) not fall within the categories prohibited by
other paragraphs of this section).
120. See Fainaru, supra note 7.
121. See supra notes 99-102, 104-08, and accompanying text; see also Fainaru, supra note
7.
122. See 31 C.F.R. § 515.415(a) (1999).
123. See 22 U.S.C §§ 6001-6021 (1994).
124. See 31 C.F.R. § 515.415(a).
125. Id. § 515.415(a)(1) (1999).
126. Id. § 515.415(a)(7) (1999).
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otherwise, in connection with travel to or from Cuba or travel or
maintenance within Cuba."'127 It is uncertain whether Peguero's alleged
purchase of airplane tickets for Perez and Diaz to fly from Cuba to the
Dominican Republic 128 violated § 515.415.
If § 515.415 is interpreted literally so as to only cover travel directly
between the U.S. and Cuba, Peguero may not have violated this section
because Perez and Diaz did not travel directly to the U.S. 129 Rather, they
first traveled to the Dominican Republic so they could sign as free agents
with the Dodgers.130 Then, the Dodgers paid for both players to travel to
the U.S. from the Dominican Republic for their minor league careers.'31
Major league agents who represent players want Cuban players to
reside in a country other than Cuba or the U.S. so teams can sign the
players as free agents when they move to the U.S. 132 The ability to avoid
conviction under § 515.415 by having the players become residents of
another country before signing with a major league team is a good
illustration of why MLB rules should be reformed.
It is also uncertain whether Peguero and the Dodgers could be
convicted for violating the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992.' This Act
expressly prohibits transactions between U.S.-owned or controlled firms
and Cuba.134 The Dodgers Campo Las Palmas Baseball Camp is owned
and controlled by the Dodger Organization. 135 Peguero was an official of
the Los Angeles Dodgers Organization and a representative of the Campo
Las Palmas Baseball Camp. 136 The Dodgers, as a U.S.-owned firm, could
not obtain a specific license for travel to Cuba because the section prohibits
the "importation of goods of Cuban origin into countries in the authorized
trade zone."' 137 Although the Cuban Democracy Act may not appear to
127. Id. § 515.415(a)(8) (1999).
128. See Plaschke, supra note 28. It is speculated Peguero or the Dodgers bought airplane
tickets so the players could travel to the Dominican Republic. See id.
129. See 31 C.F.R. § 515.415; Plaschke, supra note 28.
130. See Fainaru, supra note 7.
131. See Plaschke, supra note 28.
132. See generally Nancy San Martin, "El Duque" Balks, Puts U.S. Decision on Hold, SUN-
SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale), Jan. 2, 1998, at IA.
133. See generally 22 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6010.
134. See 22 U.S.C. § 6005(a)(1) (1994).
135. See Plaschke, supra note 28.
136. See Fainaru, supra note 7; Murray Chass, Baseball's Game of Deception in the Search
for Latin Talent, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1998, at Al. Pablo Peguero is also vice president of the
Association of Dominican Scouts. See id.
137. 31 C.F.R. § 515.559 (1999); see also 31 C.F.R. § 515.322 (1999). Section 515.322
states that "authorized trade territory includes all countries except those countries subject to
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extend to professional services between a Cuban national and an American
firm, a broad reading of this section suggests a different interpretation.
In addition, while the CACR may not seem to prohibit American
firms from assisting Cuban nationals to enter an authorized trade zone
country,3  they can be interpreted broadly to prohibit such action.
1 39
CACR § 515.559(b) does allow for the issuance of specific licenses for
U.S.-controlled firms for certain enumerated transactions with Cuba.
14°
However, Section (d) states:
specific licenses do not authorize any person within the United
States to engage in, participate in, or be involved in a licensed
transaction with... Cuban nationals. Such involvement
includes ... assistance or participation by a U.S. parent firm, ....
or employee thereof, in negotiation or performance of a
transaction which is subject to a license application.
141
This provision prohibits U.S.-owned or controlled businesses from
participating in any travel-related transaction for which a specific license
must be issued and in which the parent firm is involved.
142
Peguero's transactions in Cuba were permissible only if he obtained a
specific license under § 515.559(b). 43 Peguero did not obtain, and
presumably would never have been eligible to obtain a specific license
under the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992.144 U.S.-owned or controlled
firms may not obtain a specific license for this type of transaction when a
parent firm participates in the transaction.145 Peguero represented the
Dodger Organization when he held a tryout in Cuba and when he
negotiated baseball contracts with Cuban nationals.1"6 These contracts
sanctions pursuant to this chapter." 31 C.F.R. § 515.322. Therefore, by definition, the
Dominican Republic is an "authorized trade territory."
138. See 31 C.F.R. § 515.559.
139. See id. § 515.559(d) (1999).
140. See id. § 515.559(b) (1999) ("Specific licenses will be issued in appropriate cases for
certain categories of transactions between U.S.-owned or controlled firms in third countries and
Cuba ... ").
141. Id. § 515.559(d); see also id. § 515.330(3) (stating a "person within the United States"
includes any corporation organized under the laws of the U.S. or under the laws of any state).
142. See 31 C.F.R. § 515.559(d). "To be eligible for a [specific] license under this section,
the affiliate must be generally independent, in the conduct of transactions of the type for which
the license is being sought, in such matters as decision-making, risk-taking, negotiation, financing




146. See Plaschke, supra note 28.
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benefited the Dodger Organization and were signed under its authority. 47
Peguero did not act independently from the Dodgers J48 and, as a result, his
travel to Cuba without a specific license violated the Cuban Democracy
Act. 1
49
Peguero probably did not apply for a license to travel to Cuba because
he knew the OFAC would deny his request.5 ° As a result, Peguero
violated the CACR. l5 1 While his failure to obtain a license to travel was a
violation of the CACR, it is questionable whether prohibitions against
travel in the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 and in the CACR apply as
clearly to these specific facts. The inability to predict the outcome of this
situation bolsters the need for a modification of MLB rules. As indicated,
the CACR do not fully cover Peguero's travel to Cuba and his transactions
with Cuban baseball players.
B. Peguero Violated the Cuban Embargo by Doing Business in Cuba
Prior to 1999, a MLB team had never been caught doing business in
Cuba.'52 Because courts have never faced this situation before, the likely
outcome can best be predicted by analogizing to fact patterns where courts
have found defendants violated the Cuban embargo.
1. Specific Intent Required
In determining whether a violation of the CACR occurred, courts look
for specific intent to violate the embargo and examine the nature of the
offending activity that took place in Cuba. 5 3 The TWEA, requires specific
intent as an element of any criminal violation of the regulations.
54
"Because the regulations proscribe activity that is not generally perceived
147. See id. Ralph Avila, a Dodger Organization official, authorized Pablo Peguero's
actions. See id.
148. See id.
149. See 22 U.S.C. § § 6001-6021. This interpretation of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992
at 31 C.F.R. § 515.559, and 31 C.F.R. § 515.415 is not necessarily the interpretation a judge
would make when examining these facts. Judges deciding cases under § 515.415 have found
violations only when the travel occurred directly from Cuba to the U.S. See generally United
States v. Femandez-Pertierra, 523 F. Supp. 1135 (S.D. Fla. 1981). Research has not proffered
any case that considered facts similar to those presented in this comment.
150. See 31 C.F.R. § 515.560(g).
151. See supra notes 99-102, 104-08 and accompanying text; see also 31 C.F.R. §
515.560(g).
152. See Fainaru, supra note 7.
153. See United States v. Macko, 994 F.2d 1526, 1532-36 (1 lth Cir. 1993).
154. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 16(a) (1995) (stating willful violators of the act will either be
fined or imprisoned).
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to be wrong, [courts] have held that 'willfulness' in this context requires a
finding of specific intent to violate the trade provisions.' 1 55 To show a
defendant acted with the requisite specific intent, the U.S. Government
must prove the defendant knew of the embargo against Cuba and the
defendant intentionally violated it.'
56
In United States v. Macko, 57 the defendant Michael Macko was
accused of violating the CACR and the TWEA by conducting business
activity in Cuba.1 58  Macko had shipped several cigarette-packaging
machines to Cuba.159 Once the machines arrived, Macko traveled to Cuba
to install them. 60 While there, Macko attended business meetings with
officials and other Cubans regarding the cigarette industry.'
61
The court of appeals held the evidence against Macko adequately
supported a finding of specific intent to violate the embargo.' 62  This
evidence included the fact that Macko had misled his supplier several times
about the ultimate destination of the equipment and goods.163 In addition,
Macko had traveled to Cuba through Panama and obtained special
clearance from Cuban authorities to enter the country so his passport would
not be stamped in Cuba.164 Furthermore, Macko was found to be in
possession of Department of Treasury brochures that explained the
embargo.165 Finally, Macko initially lied to U.S. Customs agents about
traveling to and conducting transactions in Cuba.
16 6
The court relied on 31 C.F.R. § 515.201(b)(1) in analyzing Macko's
conduct under the second prong of the test for embargo violations, the
nature of the defendant's activities. 67 This section of the CACR prohibits
transactions that involve property in which a Cuban national has any
interest whatsoever. 168 Such transactions include, but are in no way limited
to, transactions involving any "payment or transfer"'16 9 to Cuba or a Cuban
155. Macko, 994 F.2d at 1532.
156. See id. at 1533.
157. 994 F.2d 1526.
158. See id. at 1527.
159. See id.
160. See id. at 1529.
161. See id.
162. See id. at 1535.




167. See id. at 1535 n.5.
168. See 31 C.F.R. § 515.201(b)(1) (1999).
169. 31 C.F.R. § 515.309(a) (1999).
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national. 70 In interpreting the regulation broadly, the court stated that it
"does not apply only to certain goods or activities, but states a broad
prohibition against transactions with Cuba or Cuban nationals."' 7' The
court of appeals reversed the district court's post-verdict judgment of
acquittal and found Macko's actions had violated this regulation.
72
Macko's illegal actions included travel to Cuba, business discussions with
Cubans and shipment to and installation of machinery inside Cuba. 173 The
court also found Macko had violated the law by sending an invoice to an
official at the Cuban embassy in Panama. 74 Based on all of this evidence,
the court determined a jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that
Macko had willfully violated the embargo, so the court upheld the jury's
guilty verdict. 17
United States v. Fuentes-Coba76 also involved a prosecution for a
violation of the Cuban embargo. "Fuentes-Coba was tried for his role in
the shipment of goods to Cuba."'177 The court of appeals upheld the
defendant's conviction of conspiracy to violate the TWEA and the CACR,
his one-year prison sentence and the $10,000 fine. 178 Here too, the court
applied the broad language of § 515.201 of the CACR to transactions in
which Cuba or Cuban nationals have an interest. 79 On appeal, Fuentes-
Coba argued there was no evidence of specific intent. 18  The court
disagreed and based its holding on evidence that the defendant had hidden
items for shipment in his own duffel bag and he usually loaded or
supervised the loading of the illegal goods onto his aircraft himself.
181
Furthermore, Fuentes-Coba disclosed in conversation the goods were
subject to the trade embargo.
82
170. See id. §§ 515.305 (1999), 515.309(a).
171. Macko, 994 F.2d at 1534.
172. See id. at 1535.
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. See id. at 1535-36.
176. 738 F.2d 1191 (llth Cir. 1984).
177. Id. at 1194.
178. See id. at 1194, 1198.
179. See id. at 1193-94.
180. See id. at 1196.
181. See id.
182. Fuentes-Coba, 738 F.2d at 1196.
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2. Peguero Had Specific Intent
In light of Macko and Fuentes-Coba, the activities of the Dodgers' are
indicative of specific intent to violate the Cuban embargo. First, Peguero
posed as a tourist when entering Cuba. 183 Peguero's failure to obtain a
specific license from OFAC is similar to Macko's traveling to Cuba
through Panama. These covert actions served to deceive the U.S. federal
government and contravened the spirit of the regulations. Second, Peguero
instructed Diaz and Perez to lie about how they traveled to the Dominican
Republic.' 84 Directing the Cuban players to lie demonstrates Peguero knew
a violation was taking place. Similarly, in Macko, the defendant lied to
U.S. customs agents.'85 The defendant also concealed his travel and
shipment of packaging machines to Cuba. 86 The court in Macko declared,
"[a] jury could reasonably conclude that the defendants' secrecy about [a]
single fact resulted from their knowledge of the Cuban embargo."'
187
In Fuentes-Coba, the defendant had several conversations in which he
acknowledged the items he was shipping were in violation of the Cuban
embargo.' 88 In analogizing these two cases to the Dodgers situation, it is
significant the Cuban players and Peguero orchestrated a lie about the
players' travel to the Dominican Republic. 8 9  Their lies are a clear
acknowledgment that Peguero's activities constituted wrongdoing. Finally,
and most importantly, MLB rules prohibit teams from scouting in Cuba.'
90
In Macko, the defendant possessed a brochure that explained the
embargo.' 9' Although Peguero was not found with the major league rules
in his possession, he could almost certainly be charged with constructive
knowledge of this rule. The totality of the circumstances suggests Peguero
specifically intended to violate the Cuban embargo.
The next step in the analysis is an examination of the nature of
Peguero's actions. First, Peguero traveled to Cuba. As the court held in
Macko, the act of traveling to Cuba without first obtaining a license is a
factor in determining whether a violation of § 515.201 has occurred.
1 92
Second, Peguero met with and scouted Diaz and Perez and many other
183. See Fainaru, supra note 7.
184. See id.
185. See Macko, 994 F.2d at 1533.
186. See id.
187. See id. at 1535.
188. See Fuentes-Coba, 738 F.2d at 1196.
189. See Fainaru, supra note 7.
190. See id.
191. See Macko, 994 F.2d at 1533.
192. See id. at 1535.
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baseball players in Cuba.' 9 3 Peguero discussed holding a tryout for Diaz
and Perez and at least one of the tryouts was videotaped by Peguero.' 94
The discussion arranging the tryouts is comparable to Macko's business
discussions with his Cuban customers because both dealt with future
transactions that would occur between the parties. 95 Finally, the Dodgers
or Peguero allegedly bought plane tickets for both players to go to the
Dominican Republic. 96 Altogether, there is enough evidence to conclude
Peguero's activities within Cuba constituted a violation of the Cuban
embargo.
3. Peguero and the Dodgers Are Subject to Severe Penalties for Their
Violations of the Cuban Embargo
Because Peguero had specific intent to violate the embargo and his
actions were of the nature proscribed by the embargo, the U.S. government
may levy heavy fines on Peguero and the Dodgers. 9 7 The Commissioner
of Baseball may also levy fines because the Dodgers' actions violated
Major League rules.
198
Section 515.701(a)(3) of the CACR provides a civil penalty for
violations of the regulations.'99 This penalty does not require a finding of
specific intent.200 Under this section, the Secretary of the Treasury may
impose a maximum fine of $55,000 for each violation.20'
Section 515.701(a)(1) of the CACR creates a criminal cause of action
against "[p]ersons who willfully violate any provision of TWEA or any
license, rule, or regulation." 20 2 "Person" under this regulation means "an
individual, partnership, association, corporation, or other organization.
' 20 3
Pursuant to this section, the federal government may fine the Dodger
Organization as much as $1,000,000.20 4 Because Peguero was acting in his
capacity as an agent of the Dodgers, his actions created liability on the part
193. See Fainaru, supra note 7.
194. See id.
195. See Macko, 994 F.2d at 1535.
196. See Plaschke, supra note 28.
197. See 31 C.F.R. § 515.701(a)(1)-( 3 ) (1999) (providing for civil and criminal fines of
varying amounts up to $ 1,000,000).
198. See Major League Agreement art. I, § 3 (1999).
199. See 31 C.F.R. § 515.701(a)(3).
200. See id.
201. See id.
202. Id. § 515.701(a)(1).
203. Id. § 515.308 (1999).
204. See id. § 515.701(a)(1).
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of the franchise. °3 Also, an officer or agent of any corporation who
knowingly violates the regulations may be fined up to $100,000 or
imprisoned for up to ten years.0 6 The government would likely pursue
criminal prosecution under § 515.701(a)(1) against Peguero and the
Dodgers because strong evidence of specific intent exists.0 7
In United States v. Fernandez-Pertierra,°8 the defendant was charged
with conspiracy to engage in transactions in connection with the
transportation of Cuban nationals to the U.S. without a license from the
OFAC. 209 The defendant was also charged with involvement in the actual
transportation of the Cuban nationals. 210  She was not, however, charged
with traveling to Cuba herself.21' The government focused its case on the
defendant's formulation of the plan and conspiracy to transport Cuban
nationals.212 By the same rationale, any Dodger official who helped
arrange or who funded Peguero's travel could also be subject to criminal
liability.
At the time of the violation, article I, section 3 of the Major League
Agreement authorized the Commissioner of Baseball to fine any major
league club up to $250,000 if the club's conduct was "deemed by the
Commissioner not to be in the best interests of [b]aseball. 21 3  The
Commissioner could only fine individuals up to $25,000.214 More
importantly, the Commissioner has the power to withhold "the benefit of
any or all [of] the [m]ajor [l]eague [r]ules, ' '215 which includes the right to
sign and retain free agents.216 In fact, the Commissioner fined the Dodgers
205. The Dodgers' liability would be based on the theory of respondeat superior. The
doctrine of respondeat superior makes an employer or principal liable for the actions of its
employees or agents if the actions of the employee or agent are in the scope of the employment.
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1313 (7th ed. 1999). Peguero is an officer of the Los Angeles
Dodgers Organization. See Chass, supra note 136.
206. See 31 C.F.R. § 515.701(a)(1).
207. See supra notes 183-90 and accompanying text.
208. 523 F. Supp. 1135 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
209. See id. at 1135-36.
210. See id. at 1136.
211. See id. at 1137 n.3.
212. See id.
213. Major League Agreement art. I, § 3; see also Ross Newhan, In Bud They Trust, L.A.
TIMEs, Jan. 26, 2000, at Dl [hereinafter In Bud They Trust]. A new amendment to the Major
League Agreement allows the Commissioner to fine a team up to $2 million dollars. See id.
214. See Major League Agreement art. I, § 3(e) (1999); see also In Bud They Trust, supra
note 213. A new amendment to the Major League Agreement allows the Commissioner to fine
an owner, officer or employee up to $500,000. See id.
215. See Major League Agreement art. I, § 3(f) (1999).
216. See id.
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$200,000 and denied the team the right to sign any foreign player for six
months.217
The Dodgers' penalty could have been more severe, but it is
nevertheless quite stringent. It is worth noting the two Cuban baseball
players who were the subject of the Dodgers' unlawful actions were not
even considered top prospects by the Dodgers Organization. 218  The
Dodgers took a giant gamble, which they ultimately lost.
V. EVOLUTION OF MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL RULES REGARDING THE
SIGNING OF CUBAN PLAYERS AND THE LOOPHOLE IN MAJOR LEAGUE
BASEBALL RULES
Major League Baseball's rules regarding the signing of Cuban players
have been evolving since 1977. 219 The Commissioner of Baseball has
played a central role in declaring major league policy towards Cubans and
their place in MLB.22°
A. The Commissioner of Baseball and His Office Have the Power to
Implement Rules and Regulations Regarding Cuban Players
The Commissioner of Baseball has "nearly unbridled power" over the
game of baseball.22' The Major League Agreement gives the
Commissioner the power "[t]o investigate.., any act, transaction or
.practice charged, alleged or suspected to be not in the best interests of the
national game of [b]aseball. 222 Where the Commissioner finds such acts,
transactions or practices, he has the power to determine what "preventive,
remedial or punitive action is appropriate. 223  Some limitations are
imposed on the Commissioner, but the Major League Agreement expressly
states no limitation shall have the force of restricting the Commissioner's
217. See Bodley, supra note 11. The Dodgers were allowed, however, to sign two foreign
players with whom they had already begun negotiations. See id.
218. See Plaschke, supra note 28. After approximately two years, Juan Carlos Diaz had a
.303 batting average with nine home runs in sixty-six games at the Dodgers class AA affiliate San
Antonio. See Fainaru, supra note 7. Perez was batting an average of .279 with fourteen stolen
bases at the Dodgers class A Vero Beach. See id.
219. See Baxter & Dominguez, supra note 1 at 13-14.
220. See generally id.
221. See Matthew B. Pachman, Note, Limits on the Discretionary Powers of Professional
Sports Commissioners: A Historical and Legal Analysis of Issues Raised by the Pete Rose
Controversy, 76 VA. L. REv. 1409, 1417 (1990).
222. Major League Agreement art. I § 2(b) (1999).
223. Id. § 2(c) (1999).
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authority to "act on any matter that involves the integrity of, or public
confidence in, the national game of [b]aseball. '224
B. The Evolution of Major League Baseball Rules Regarding the Draft
Status of Cuban Baseball Players
In 1977, Bowie Kuhn was the first Commissioner of Baseball to give
a direct order to all major league teams regarding Cuban players.225 In
1990, the Commissioner updated that order when he released a memo that
forbade "'the discussion or negotiation with anyone in Cuba regarding the
signing of any player in Cuba."' 226 This broad statement prohibits MLB
teams from scouting in Cuba and from helping Cuban baseball players
defect.
227
1. The Emergence of a "Loophole" in Major League Baseball Rules.
The first Cuban baseball player defected to the U.S. in 1991.228 Since
then, MLB rules regarding Cuban players have been in a constant state of
flux. The emergence of the "loophole" is evidence of this.
Rene Arocha was the first Cuban baseball player to defect to the
U.S. 229 Manuel Hurtado, a former Cuban National Team pitching coach
who had defected a couple of years earlier, set up a special tryout for
Arocha with eight MLB teams that were all pursuing him. 230 Never having
faced this situation before, Major League Baseball came up with an
interesting solution. In order to decide which team would sign him, a
special lottery was formed.23 ' The name of each team was placed in a hat
224. See id. § 4 (1999).
225. See Baxter & Dominguez, supra note 1, at 13.
226. See id. (citing memorandum from the Commissioner of Baseball to MLB teams
regarding Cuban Players). It is the usual practice for the Commissioner to implement such rules
through memos and letters sent to the offices of major league teams. See, e.g., Selig to Conduct
Review of Detroit's Hiring Process (Oct. 14, 1999) <http://www.majorleaguebaseball.com/u/
baseball/mlbconi/news/oct99/prreleasel01599.htm>. The Baseball Commissioner, Allan H.
(Bud) Selig, issued a statement to all teams requiring them to consider minority candidates for all
hiring of high-level operating positions. Id. Commissioner Bud Selig implemented this
affirmative action rule simply through a statement to all teams. See id.
227. See generally Christensen, supra note 17.
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and the winner was selected at random. 232 The Saint Louis Cardinals won
the right to sign Arocha as a free agent.
233
In October of 1994, three Cuban baseball players, Alexis Cabreja,
Osmani Estrada and Ivan Alvarez defected to Mexico and then
immediately entered the U.S. 234 In violation of the law, they did not report
their entry to the U.S. immigration office.235 The three players argued they
should be free agents, but the Commissioner of Baseball mandated no
major league team could negotiate with them because they were in the U.S.
illegally.236 Even though the three players agreed to meet with immigration
officials, the Commissioner's Office refused to hold a lottery like the one
held for Arocha.23 7 Instead, the Commissioner's Office made the three
players participate in the yearly amateur draft.23 8 This is now the general
rule whenever a Cuban baseball player defects directly to the U.S.
239
The general amateur draft rule, however has a loophole.240 If a Cuban
player defects to the Dominican Republic, the Bahamas, Costa Rica or any
nation other than the U.S., and establishes legal residency there, he is not
subject to the general amateur draft rule.241 Instead, players who defect to
232. See id.
233. See id.





239. Major League Rule 3(a)(l)(A) provides:
A player who has not previously contracted with a Major or Minor League Club,
and who is a resident of the United States or Canada, may be signed to a contract
only after having been eligible for selection in the Rule 4 draft. A player shall be
considered a "resident of the United States" if the player enrolls in a United States
high school or college or establishes a legal residence in the United States on the
date of the player's contract or within one year prior to that date.
Major League Rule 3(a)(1)(A) (1999) (emphasis added); see also Baxter & Dominguez,
supra note 1, at 14. If a Cuban player comes directly to the U.S. and gains political
asylum, he is forced by MLB to enter the June amateur draft under Rule 3(a)(1)(A). See
Baxter & Dominguez, supra note 1, at 14.
240. See Major League Rule 3(a)(l)(B) (1999).
241. Major League Rule 3(a)(1)(B) provides:
A player who has not previously contracted with a Major or Minor League Club,
who is not a resident of the United States or Canada, and who is not subject to the
High School, College, Junior College or American Legion Rules, may be signed to
a contract if the player:
(i) is at least 17 years old at the time of signing, or
(ii) is 16 at the time of signing, but will attain age 17 prior to either the end of the
effective season for which the player has signed or September 1 of such effective
season, whichever is later.
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these other nations are free agents.242 As a result, such players may bypass
the draft and sign a contract with the team of their choice, usually the team
that is the highest bidder for the players' services.
243
It is this exception that encouraged the Dodgers to violate the
embargo. The Dodgers understood if the Cuban players, Diaz and Perez,
could defect from Cuba and establish residency outside the U.S., the
Dodgers would then have free agent rights to the players.2" Diaz and
Perez attained this free agent status when they defected to the Dominican
Republic,245  obtained visas and established residency there.24
Furthermore, the Dodgers used the loophole to impose low-paying
contracts on Diaz and Perez by not giving the players the opportunity to
retain agents.247
On the other hand, if Diaz and Perez had defected to the U.S., with or
without the Dodgers' help, they would have been forced to enter the
amateur draft.248 In this scenario, the Dodgers would not have been able to
obtain free agent contracts with the players.249  The Dodgers could then
have only obtained the players through the amateur draft. Whether the
Dodgers could have acquired the players through the draft would have
depended on the Dodgers' priority in the draft selection process.
251
Major League Rule 3(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added); see also David Beard, For Hernandez, a win-
win call, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale), Jan. 8, 1998, at Al [hereinafter For Hernandez];
Friends Get Visas, supra note 15; San Martin, supra note 132.
242. See Major League Rule 3(a)(l)(B). Rule 3(a)(1)(B), which is applied to non-U.S.
residents, does not require that players be eligible for selection in the Rule 4 draft (amateur draft)
unlike Rule 3(a)(l)(A), which applies to U.S., Canadian, and Puerto Rican citizens. See id.
Therefore, players under Rule 3(a)(l)(B) can sign as free agents. See generally Baxter, supra
note 15, at 20.
243. See Friends Get Visas, supra note 15.
244. See supra text accompanying notes 239-42.
245. See Fainaru, supra note 7.
246. See Plaschke, supra note 28; see also Fainaru, supra note 7.
247. See Fainaru, supra note 7.
248. See supra text accompanying notes 239-42.
249. See Major League Rule 3(a)(l)(A).
250. See id. Players who defect to the U.S. from Cuba are "officially untouchable [from
free agency signing] as far as Major League Baseball is concerned." See Baxter & Dominguez
supra note 1, at 14.
251. See Major League Rule 4(c) (1999); see also Wayne Coffey, Puerto Rico Feels the
Draft, DAILY NEWS (New York), May 26, 1999, available at
<http://www.nydailynews.com/1999-05-26/Metro Sports/Baseball/a-29899.asp>; Bill Madden,
Moving Toward a Worldwide Draft, DAILY NEWS (New York), May 26, 1999, available at
<http://www.nydailynews.com/1999-05-26/MetroSports/Baseball/a- 2 9901.asp> [hereinafter a
Worldwide Draft]. Free agency for non-U.S. residents gives high payroll teams like the Los
Angeles Dodgers an advantage. See id. A similar situation to that described in this section
involves Willie Pefia. Willie Pefia, a top prospect from the Dominican Republic, signed a $3.7
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2. The Loophole at Work for the Cuban Pitcher "El Duque"
The opportunity of the loophole led sports agent Joe Cubas to help
Cuban players who were stuck in refugee detention centers quickly obtain
visas.252  Once the players were out of detention, Cubas used his own
money to transport his new clients to the Dominican Republic and the
Bahamas.253 He has also used his finances to feed and house his new
clients in their new countries while their applications for residency were
pending.254 Cubas exerted this effort and expended his resources so the
players could enter MLB as free agents.255
On December 26, 1997, Orlando Hernandez, a Cuban pitcher known
by the nickname "El Duque," left Cuba for the U.S. in a twenty-foot
sailboat with seven of his friends.256 Four days later, they were forced to
land in the Bahamas because their crippled ship could not continue the
journey 7 The Bahamian government placed El Duque in the Carmichael
Road Detention Center while deciding whether to send him back to
Cuba.258  While El Duque was in the Bahamas, Bud Selig, the
Commissioner of Baseball, ordered no major league team could meet with
him.259 Joe Cubas immediately went to the Bahamas and urged El Duque
to seek refuge in a third country because it was uncertain whether the
Bahamas would grant El Duque refuge or send him back to Cuba.26° Cubas
arranged with Costa Rican President Jose Maria Figueras for the issuance
of an indefinite, temporary visa for El Duque.261 Cubas chartered a flight to
Costa Rica for El Duque so he could begin workouts and achieve "baseball
million dollar free agent deal with the Yankees. See id. If Pefia had been in the amateur draft,
many believe he would have been a top three pick. See id. The Yankees picked 30th in the draft
and would otherwise not have been able to sign Pefia. See id. The Dodgers may have been
unable to sign Diaz and Perez through the draft without violating major league rules.
252. See generally Baxter, supra note 15, at 18, 20.
253. See id. at 20.
254. See id.
255. See id.
256. See San Martin, supra note 132.
257. See Friends Get Visas, supra note 15; see also William Branigin & Mark Asher,
Cuban Baseball Defector Gets "Humanitarian Parole, " WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 1998, at Al.
258. See Baxter, supra note 15, at 18; Branigin & Asher, supra note 257, at Al.
259. See Hernandez Not Ready to Leave Friends, TAMPA TRIB., Jan. 2, 1998, at 3
[hereinafter Not Ready]. Al Avila, the Florida Marlins' director of Latin American operations,
stated, "[t]he [C]ommissioner will tell each club when they can see him and when they can
negotiate. Right now, you couldn't go and negotiate with him, his agent or anybody. That would
be illegal." Id. However, interaction with Joe Cubas was allowed under major league rules. See
id.
260. See id.
261. See ]Friends Get Visas, supra note 15.
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shape" for a tryout with major league teams before the 1998 spring training
which was to begin the following month.262 El Duque signed a 6.6 million-
dollar contract as a free agent with the New York Yankees.
263
Much like the Dodgers, Cubas has taken serious risks in order to
bypass major league rules through the loophole.264 Before El Duque went
to Costa Rica, the American State Department offered El Duque a special
humanitarian visa, expecting it would lead him to join his brother, Livan, in
South Florida.265 El Duque turned down the humanitarian visa.266 Cubas
advised this action even though many believed it would be detrimental to
El Duque's life and career.267
Cubas took a big risk when he helped El Duque because El Duque's
talent was uncertain. In the same fashion, the Dodgers risked violating the
Cuban embargo for Diaz and Perez.268 In Cuba, El Duque had been
working for a psychiatric hospital and earning ten dollars a month as a
sports trainer.269 El Duque last pitched in 1996, when he played for the
hospital team in an amateur baseball game.270 Finally, many professional
scouts believed El Duque was in fact closer to thirty-five years-old than the
twenty-eight El Duque claimed. 271 The risks Cubas and the Dodgers took
will never outweigh the benefit of free agent access to an undiscovered
Cuban baseball player.
262. See For Hernandez, supra note 241.
263. See Baxter, supra note 15, at 18.
264. See generally id. at 20.
265. See Not Ready, supra note 259. The U.S. gave El Duque special treatment because of
the way the Cuban government had treated him. See id. Cuba had banned El Duque from
baseball after his brother Livan defected from Cuba. See id. Furthermore, the Cuban-American
community organized and urged the U.S. government to allow El Duque and the other defectors
to enter the U.S. as soon as possible. See Branigin and Asher, supra note 257, at Al. The Cuban-
American community believed that El Duque would be punished in Cuba if the Bahamian
government returned him there. See id.
266. See Not Ready, supra note 259.
267. See San Martin, supra note 132. Manny Hillman, attorney for Livan Hemandez, El
Duque's brother, stated, "[t]his is what he asked for .... Now if he says, '[t]hanks, but no thanks,
I'm going to Costa Rica,' there are going to be a lot of angry people in Washington. And they
may not let him back in." Id.
268. See Plaschke, supra note 28. Neither Diaz nor Perez were considered top prospects in
the Dodger Organization. See id.
269. See Branigin & Asher, supra note 257.
270. See San Martin, supra note 132. When asked how he performed in that game,
Hernandez said he struck out eleven or twelve batters. See id.
271. See id.
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C. American Baseball Has Strained Reparation Treaties Between Cuba
and Several Countries Including the United States, the Dominican Republic
and the Bahamas
While Cubas' fast action helped Orlando Hernandez, the agent caused
many problems for other Cuban refugees in the process. 272  Most
importantly, Joe Cubas' actions strained refugee treaty agreements between
Cuba and the governments of the Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic and
the Bahamas.273 The Dodgers' actions in Cuba also violated U.S. policy
regarding Cuban migrants.2 74
1. The United States and Its Treaty with Cuba
The U.S. and Cuba first entered into an agreement to regulate the flow
of Cubans into the U.S. on September 9, 1994.275 The agreement
announced the U.S. would increase the total number of legal Cuban
entrants per year to 20,000.276 In return, Cuba made a commitment to
reduce the number of migrants entering from the country.277 Furthermore,
on September 9, 1994, President Clinton declared persons fleeing from
Cuba could qualify for assistance pursuant to the Migration and Refugee
Assistance Act of 1962.278
On May 2, 1995, the U.S. and Cuba modified their co-existing
agreement. 279 First, the modified agreement recognized the U.S. could give
humanitarian parole to Cubans "beyond those eligible for parole under the
existing criteria., 280 The U.S. grants a total of 20,000 humanitarian paroles
per year.281 Paroles can be given to Cubans who have been unfairly treated
in Cuba.282 The U.S. can use up to 5,000 of the "extended criteria"
humanitarian paroles out of the 20,000 Cubans allowed to enter the U.S. as
272. See Baxter, supra note 15, at 21.
273. See id.
274. See infra Part V.C. 1.
275. See Statement on the Cuba-United States Agreement on Migration, PUB. PAPERS (Sept.
9, 1994).
276. See Janet Reno, et al., White House Press Briefing (May 3, 1995), M2 PRESSWtRE,
available in LEXIS News Library, News Group File [hereinafter Press Briefing].
277. See id.
278. See Determination No. 94-48, 59 Fed. Reg. 48,555 (1994).
279. See Joint Statement With the Republic of Cuba on Normalization of Migration, PUB.
PAPERS (May 2, 1995) [hereinafter Joint Statement].
280. Id.
281. See Erin Coyle, Some Immigrants Find Cool Welcome to Melting Pot, PALM BEACH
POST, July 26, 1999, at lB. "Parole" in this context means expedited entry into the U.S. See id.
282. See San Martin, supra note 132.
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required by the September 9, 1994 agreement. 8 3 As previously noted,
humanitarian parole was offered to Orlando Hernandez, but he turned it
down.28 Second, the two countries agreed to prevent unsafe departures
from Cuba.285 The United States Coast Guard has actively enforced this
U.S.-Cuban repatriation treaty. 86 When the Coast Guard returns refugees
to Cuba, U.S. officials in Cuba explain to the would-be migrants how to
apply for legal admission into the U.S. 287 Finally, the modified agreement
ensured the Cuban government would not persecute those Cubans returned
to Cuba by the U.S. Coast Guard.
28
The loophole in major league rules and the recent actions of the
Dodgers and Joe Cubas undermined the established U.S. policy towards
Cuban immigrants. El Duque's decision to decline a humanitarian visa
2 9
served to ignore and destroy efforts made by the U.S. government to fulfill
its agreement with the Republic of Cuba. Furthermore, this decision
completely disregarded the help offered by the U.S., which stood for his
own livelihood. 90
Similarly, the actions by the Dodgers not only violated the embargo
but also skirted the United States' immigration policy. From the beginning,
Diaz and Perez planned to emigrate to the U.S. 2 91 Diaz and Perez bypassed
all of the documentation requirements of the treaty.
292
283. See Joint Statement, supra note 279.
284. See San Martin, supra note 132.
285. See Joint Statement, supra note 279; Press Briefing, supra note 276 ("Effective
immediately, Cuban migrants intercepted at sea, attempting to enter the United States... will be
taken to Cuba .... ).
286. See Coast Guard Migrant Interdiction Operations: Hearing on H.R. 238 Before the
Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999).
U.S. Coast Guard Captain Anthony S. Tangeman stated "most migrants interdicted by the Coast
Guard are not brought into the U.S. and are repatriated to the country from which they originally
departed." Id.
287. Press Briefing, supra note 276 ("U.S. consular officers will assist those who wish to
apply to come to the United States through already-established mechanisms. Cubans must know
that the only way to come to the United States is by applying in Cuba .... Cuba is one of only
three countries in the world in which the United States conducts in-country processing for
refugees.").
288. See Joint Statement, supra note 279; see also Press Briefing, supra note 276 ("The
government of Cuba has committed to the government of the United States that no one will suffer
reprisals, lose benefits or be prejudiced in any manner, either because he or she sought to depart
irregularly, or because he or she has applied for refugee status at the United States interest
section.").
289. See Not Ready, supra note 259.
290. See id. The U.S. offered the humanitarian parole, expecting him to join his brother
Livan. See id.
291. See generally Plaschke, supra note 28.
292. See id.
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The major league loophole directly conflicts with one of the major
goals established by the U.S.-Cuban treaty, namely, safe travel.293 "Safety
of life at sea" is a common interest of the U.S. and Cuba.294 Because Fidel
Castro enjoys baseball and does not want to lose players to the U.S.,
295
Cuban baseball players deciding to defect must do so in complete
secrecy.296 Understandably, Cuban baseball players that recognize the
benefits of the loophole, like El Duque, will try to take advantage of it.
Unfortunately, most will not be as lucky as he.297 Boats used by Cubans to
travel from Cuba to the U.S. are often poorly made, overloaded and
unsafe.298  Attempts to travel to the U.S. often end in death.299  The
loophole does not encourage safe sea travel and is contrary to policy
decisions of the U.S.
2. The Bahamas, the Dominican Republic and Their Treaties with Cuba
In 1996, the Bahamas followed the lead of the U.S. by signing a
repatriation treaty with Cuba.300 On June 19, 1998, the Bahamas and Cuba
amended their agreement to accelerate the repatriation process by
mandating the Bahamas notify Cuba within seventy-two hours of the
arrival of any Cuban migrant in the Bahamas.30' In return, Cuba allows the
immigrant to return within fifteen days of the immigrant's arrival.30 2 Janet
Bostwick, the Bahamian Minister of Foreign Affairs, explained their
agreement is equivalent to Cuba's agreements with the United Kingdom,
Cayman Islands, Jamaica and the U.S. 30 3 The Dominican Republic also has
a repatriation agreement with Cuba.
304
293. See Joint Statement, supra note 279.
294. See id.
295. See generally Baxter & Dominguez, supra note 1, at 13.
296. See generally Serge F. Kovaleski, Cubans Rescued by Fishing Crew in Nick of Time,
WASH. POST, Mar. 24, 1998, at A12. Nine men, of whom four were baseball players and one was
a baseball coach, hid in the basement of a house for several days waiting for weather to clear
before they set sail from Cuba. See id.




300. See Bahamas Puts Cuban Refugees on Plane Home, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 6,
1998, at A6 [hereinafter Plane Home].
301. See generally Bahamas and Cuba Sign Repatriation Agreement, BBC WORLDWIDE
MONITORING BROADCAST, June 21, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, News Group File.
302. See id.
303. See id.
304. See Baxter, supra note 15, at 21.
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In addition to interfering with U.S. foreign policy, Joe Cubas has
caused unwanted problems in the Bahamas, the Dominican Republic and
Costa Rica. The Dominican Republic strengthened its agreement with
Cuba after Joe Cubas established two training camps in the Dominican
Republic for defectors. °5
The Cuban government's breach of its agreement with the Bahamas
arguably turned out to be the greatest consequence of El Duque's
defection.0 6 Embarrassed and angered by the handling of this situation,
Cuba refused to accept repatriated refugees from the Bahamas. 307  As a
consequence, the populations at the Bahamian camps grew
uncontrollably. °8
As a result of another baseball-related event that occurred three
months after El Duque left the Bahamas for Costa Rica,30 9 the Bahamian
and Costa Rican governments changed their practices toward Cuban
refugees.310 Once again, Joe Cubas was involved with four Cuban baseball
players who fled Cuba for the Bahamas.31' However this time, Cubas was
unsuccessful in helping the players.
312
First, Costa Rica refused to help Cubas when he requested 151 visas
for the players and the other refugees to travel from the Bahamas to Costa
Rica.313 Presumably, the Costa Rican officials denied the visa request
because they believed Cubas was abusing the system. Cubas was under
immense pressure from humanitarian groups to request the visas, which
were intended for Cuban refugees who had rioted when Cubas visited the
camp to help the five baseball players.314 The rioters knew the baseball
players were receiving preferential treatment.315
Likewise, the Bahamian government took a stronger stance toward
Cubas and the Cuban players because it did not want the Bahamas to
305. See id.
306. See generally Plane Home, supra note 300.
307. See id.
308. See id.
309. See Kovaleski, supra note 296.
310. See Baxter, supra note 15, at 21.
311. See Kovaleski, supra note 296. The players were first baseman Jorge Luis Toca,
catcher Angel Lopez, second basemen Jorge Diaz Olano, shortstop Michael Jova and coach
Enrique Chinea. See id. The players had been banned from baseball in Cuba because they were
suspected of wanting to defect. See id.
312. See generally Baxter, supra note 15, at 19, 21; Bahamas Returns Refugees to Cuba,
STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), May 22, 1998, at 6A [hereinafter Bahamas Returns].
313. See Baxter, supra note 15, at 19, 21.
314. See id. at 19.
315. See The Cubans Who Don't Play Baseball, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1998, at A20.
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become a way station for Cubans trying to enter the U.S. 31 6 The Bahamian
government stated it would no longer allow any Cuban refugee in the
Bahamas to go to another country offering emergency visas.317 Three of
the players were eventually deported back to Cuba even though Nicaragua
had granted them visas.31 8 The three players were among sixty-five people
returned to Cuba on May 18, 1998. 3 ' 9  The Bahamas' new policy
culminated in the amendment of its agreement with Cuba on June 19,
1998.320 Joe Cubas successfully closed one of the few escape routes for
Cubans.321
VI. THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL
CAN REMEDY THIS DAMAGING SITUATION
A. A Solution Can Be Instituted by the United States Government
Recently, Cuba and the U.S. have made great strides toward
improving their relationship. In January 1999, President Clinton
reestablished direct mail with Cuba and began allowing Americans to send
money to individual Cubans who are not family members.322 In August
1999, President Clinton authorized charter flights to Cuba from Los
Angeles and New York for the first time since 1982.323
Another important step toward better relations with Cuba has been
through baseball. In the spring of 1999, President Clinton allowed the
Baltimore Orioles to play the Cuban National Baseball Team in Cuba.
324
This game was aimed at promoting "people-to-people contacts. ' 325 The
316. See Bahamas Returns, supra note 312; Plane Home, supra note 300.
317. See Bahamas Returns, supra note 312.
318. See id.; see also Cuban Defector Takes Japan's Asylum Offer, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 3,
1998, at 12 [hereinafter Cuban Defector]. Jorge Luis Toca qualified for a visa from Japan
because his wife was Japanese. See id. He originally turned down the offer because he was
waiting for the Costa Rican visa. See id. Once he realized Costa Rica was not going to offer a
visa, he asked for reconsideration of the Japanese offer. See id.
319. See Bahamas Returns, supra note 312.
320. See supra Part V.C.2.
321. See Plane Home, supra note 300.
322. See Norman Kempster, U.S. Authorizes Charter Flights to Cuba From L.A., N.Y., L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 4, 1999, at Bl.
323. See id.; see also Baby Step in Easing Cuba Policy, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1999, at B8.
324. See Golden, supra note 74.
325. See 31 C.F.R. § 515.567(b)(1)(ii) (1999) ("All profits from the [athletic] event after
costs are donated to an independent nongovernmental organization in Cuba or a U.S.-based
charity, with the objective, to the extent possible, of promoting people-to-people contacts or
otherwise benefiting [sic] the Cuban people.").
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White House plans to promote more sporting events between the two
nations in the future.326 Yet, because the Helms-Burton Act of 1996 gives
Congress complete power to amend the Cuban embargo, Presidential action
can only go so far.327
On September 12, 1995, H.R. 2311, entitled "A Bill to Waive Certain
Prohibitions With Respect to Nationals of Cuba Coming to the United
States to Play Organized Professional Baseball," was introduced in the
House of Representatives.328 If it had passed, section one of H.R. 2311
would have prevented the Cuban embargo from regulating or prohibiting
the entrance of a Cuban national into the U.S. on a visa issued for the
purpose of playing baseball.329 Section two of the Bill would have allowed
Cuban nationals to receive visas valid for the duration of a baseball
season.330  As long as a Cuban player had a valid contract with an
American professional baseball team, he would not have to renew the visa
each season. 33' Although this Bill did not progress very far in the
legislative process, 332 it indicates a limited number of U.S. legislators
understand the high quality baseball talent in Cuba.
H.R. 2311 was proposed prior to the enactment of the Helms-Burton
Act of 1996 .33 3 The Bill has recently been re-introduced as the Baseball
Diplomacy Act.334 Today, as H.R. 262, it is clearly within congressional
authority.336 Nevertheless, the Bill will not deter teams and agents from
violating the Cuban embargo. Besides this inherent problem, Congress'
five-year reluctance to pass this bill indicates congressional action is
unlikely to resolve the issue.337  Even if Congress was willing to
326. See Golden, supra note 74. Unfortunately, the State Department has rejected new
proposals because it has not decided how the U.S. can participate in an event without generating
revenue for Cuba. See id.
327. See generally 22 U.S.C. §§ 6061-6066 (Supp. III 1998).
328. See H.R. 2311, 104th Cong. § 1 (1994).
329. See id. § l(a)(1) (1994).
330. See id. § 2 (1994).
331. See id. § 2(2) (1994).
332. See H.R. 2311. The bill was referred to the Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims
on October 2, 1995, but failed to go any further in the legislative process. See id.
333. See id.
334. See H.R. 262, 106th Cong. (1999).
335. See id.
336. See generally 22 U.S.C. §§ 6061-6066 (1994).
337. In 1999, this bill did not pass the sub-committee process and there were only 22 co-
sponsors for the bill. See H.R. 262. But see Matthew N. Greller, Note and Comment, Give Me
Your Tired, Your Poor, Your Fastball Pitchers Yearning for Strike Three: How Baseball
Diplomacy Can Revitalize Major League Baseball and United States-Cuba Relations, 14 AM. U.
J. INT'L L. REv. 1647, 1709 (1999). Greller advocates for the passage of H.R. 262, enabling
"Baseball Diplomacy" to unite the U.S. and Cuba. See id. However, Congressional reluctance to
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compromise, the task of mending the wounds inflicted by members of the
Major League Baseball Organization should be the job of that organization.
MLB is in a much better position to rectify the problems because their
efforts to implement any proposal they accept would be more quick and
efficient than a congressional remedy. This is due to the plenary power of
the Commissioner. 338 In addition, MLB could tailor a remedy that is in the
best interests of baseball.
B. Major League Baseball Has Been Aware of Problems But Has Taken No
Action to Resolve Them
This Comment has pointed out some of the many infirmities of MLB
rules that encompass the signing of international players, specifically
Cubans. Unfortunately, there are many more. Officials in the Dominican
Republic have disclosed only three major league teams comply with local
Dominican rules.3 39  These rules require major league teams to report
contract signings and provide proper birth certificates whenever they sign
Dominican players in the Dominican Republic.
3 40
As recently as December 1999, the Dodgers were punished for
signing Adrian Beltre, a baseball player from the Dominican Republic.34'
The penalty included a one-year closure of the Campo Las Palmas Baseball
Camp in the Dominican Republic, the same camp Diaz and Perez
attended.
3 42
change the embargo makes passage of this bill unlikely. Therefore, MLB must step to the
forefront and change their rules unilaterally.
338. See In Bud They Trust, supra note 213. Owners significantly increased the
Commissioner's authority by authorizing him to "take such action as he deems appropriate to
ensure an appropriate level of long-term competitive balance." Id. Most often, the big-budget
teams like the Dodgers and Yankees attain free-agent rights to Cuban players who enter the
league through the loophole. See Madden, supra note 251. It is possible the Commissioner could
use this new power as an excuse to resolve the problems between MLB and Cuban players.
339. See Chass, supra note 136.
340. See id. The birth certificates are needed because no foreign player can be signed until
he is sixteen years-old. See Major League Rule 3(a)(1)(B)(ii) (1999).
341. See Ross Newhan, Beltre Investigation Could Last a While, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 16,
1999, at D6; see also Ross Newhan, Lasorda Says Many Players Sign Illegally, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
17, 1999, at D1 [hereinafter Lasorda Says]. Adrian Beltre learned the Dodgers violated the rule
in a discussion with his agent in the summer of 1999. See id. His agent, Scott Boras, said the
birth certificate given to the Dodgers showed he was only fifteen at the time of signing. See id.
Scott Boras requested the Commissioner of Baseball declare Beltre a free agent. See id.
Interestingly, Pablo Peguero, the same man who violated the Cuban embargo, signed Adrian
Beltre. See Tim Brown, Dodger Penalty is Far-Reaching, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1999, at DI.
342. See Brown, supra note 341. Because of the Beltre incident, the Dodgers were fined
$50,000, ordered to pay Beltre $48,500 and were banned from scouting or signing in the
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In addition to concern over the pattern of wrongful conduct by the
Dodgers, Dominican officials are concerned about the existence of
makeshift training camps in the Dominican Republic.343 These camps have
been developed to train players with the goal of selling them to major
league teams.344  Both the public and MLB have been aware of these
problems as early as March, 1998.
Moreover, some have argued the minimum age limit imposed by the
Major League Rules346 discriminates against American, Puerto Rican and
Canadian baseball players.347 U.S. players can sign their first contract only
if they are eligible for the amateur draft and are chosen by a major league
team.348 Unlike foreign players, U.S. players cannot become free agents
when first entering into the MLB. 349  This reduces American players'
bargaining power.
Clearly, the loophole and other MLB rules have caused numerous
problems. The Dodgers would not have violated the Cuban embargo if
there had been no resulting benefit.350  The Dodgers understood if they
helped get the players out of Cuba, the team could sign them as free agents
for a bargain basement price.351 Arguably, agents like Joe Cubas would not
disrupt the foreign policy of the U.S., the Dominican Republic, the
Bahamas and Costa Rica if not for the lucrative benefits posed by the
loophole.352 Members of the baseball community have accused Cubas of
Dominican Republic for one year. See id. In addition, Campo Las Palmas was ordered closed for
a year. See id. Furthermore, Pablo Peguero was suspended for one year. See id.
343. See Chass, supra note 136.
344. See id. Ironically, Pablo Peguero, after hearing these stories, was quoted as saying he
was going to send a letter of complaint to the American Bar Association regarding the agents who
were working in the Dominican Republic without a proper work permit. See id.
345. See id. (These problems were first reported when this article was published in March,
1998).
346. See Major League Rule 3(a)(1) (1999). Under Rule 3, "United States" means "the 50
States of the United States of America, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and any other
Commonwealth, Territory or Possession of the United States of America." Id.; salso Major
League Rule 3(a)(2)(A) (1999). Players born in the United States, Canada and Puerto Rico must
finish their senior year of high school before they can sign a contract with a major league team.
See id.; see also Chass, supra note 136.
347. See Madden, supra note 251. Major League Baseball Players Association ("MLBPA")
counsel Gene Orza stated, "[y]ou have a situation now where a player who lives in Texas has less
rights than a player born in Italy." Id.; see also supra note 346 and accompanying text.
348. See Madden, supra note 251.
349. See Major League Rule 3(a)(1)(A) (1999) ("A player who... is a resident of the
United States or Canada, may be signed to a contract only after having been eligible for selection
in the Rule 4 draft.").
350. See supra notes 244-50 and accompanying text.
351. See Plaschke, supra note 28.
352. See generally Baxter, supra note 15, at 18.
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breaking major league rules and the embargo.353 It is clear the price is too
high for these actions to continue and the solution has always been simple.
MLB can prevent further embarrassments in the future and regain its
respect as America's pastime simply by amending the rules.
C. Solutions for Major League Baseball to Resolve the Problems Created
by the Loophole
Even if the loophole remains in place, baseball does have power to
stop the problems that are occurring. The Major League Baseball Players
Association ("MLBPA") has the authority to regulate baseball agents.354
The MLBPA has the authority to suspend an agent's certification or to take
other disciplinary action if the agent is found to be "[e]ngaging in unlawful
conduct and/or conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit,
misrepresentation, or other conduct which reflects adversely on his fitness
as a Player agent., 35 5  The broad language of this provision could be
adapted to suspend agents who violate the Cuban embargo, falsify birth
certificates or act as an agent without a license. If no action is taken to
modify the loophole, the Commissioner's Office must urge the MLBPA to
enforce this section with the goal of preserving the integrity of the game.
In addition, the Commissioner of Baseball has the right to cite teams
that engage in conduct that is not in the best interest of baseball.356 But
fines are not enough in an era where teams are owned by multi-million
dollar corporations such as the Fox Entertainment Group and the Walt
Disney Company. Baseball must modify the loophole.
353. See Lasorda Says, supra note 341. Tommy Lasorda explained the Dodgers did the
same thing as Joe Cubas when the Dodgers illegally signed the two Cuban players. See id.
Lasorda stated:
Cubas brings these guys in and says they were left on a raft for 14 days. But these
[Cubans] never lost an ounce of weight from the time they left Cuba. They pick
'em up two miles out of the limit, get them on a yacht, take them to the Bahamas,
put them in a suite, feed them like kings, and these [Cubans] said they were on a
raft for 14 hours [sic], fighting sharks, and landed in the wrong place.
Id.
354. See generally MLBPA Regulations Governing Player Agents (1993).
355. See id. art. IV, § 3(B)(12) (1993).
356. See Major League Agreement art. I, § 3 (1999); see also In Bud They Trust, supra note
213. The new amendments to the Major League Agreement allow the Commissioner to fine a
team up to $2 million dollars and an owner, officer or employee up to $500,000. See In Bud They
Trust, supra note 213. The author of this comment still believes this is not enough of an effective
deterrent for those who wish to break the rules.
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The proper solution is the implementation of a "world-wide draft.9
3 57
This would include the complete elimination of free agent status for any
foreign player. Thus, all amateur players, no matter what nationality,
would have to participate in the amateur draft. American, Canadian and
Puerto Rican born players would receive the same type of compensation
and treatment as the foreign players with the exception of the age
requirement. Major league teams would be forbidden to sign players
independently. Even if they were not forbidden to sign talent, they would
have little or no incentive to help defectors or other foreign players because
teams would only have the right to negotiate with players they selected
through the draft.
The proposal is not as foolproof when applied to agents, but it is still
workable. Simply put, an agent wants to represent players. An agent will
want to help a Cuban player defect so the player will use the agent's
services. Although this would not change under the proposal, agents would
not be as eager to help a defector obtain political asylum once the player
left Cuba because the player would not become a free agent. Consider El
Duque's situation under this proposal. The U.S. offered him humanitarian
parole, but El Duque turned it down because Cubas, his agent, had set up
an arrangement with Costa Rica.358 Under this worldwide draft proposal,
Cubas would have no incentive to make such an arrangement because El
Duque could never be a free agent. El Duque would have had to accept the
United States' offer in order to play baseball, and U.S. foreign policy
would have prevailed.
In addition, under this proposal, any agent violating the Cuban
embargo would be dismissed as a player's agent under the MLBPA
regulations359 and criminally prosecuted under the CACR.36° If caught
interfering in the political asylum process, agents would be reprimanded as
well. MLB and the MLBPA will have to take a much more active stance
against this type of action than they are currently taking.
357. See Madden, supra note 251. Madden discusses a different type of a worldwide draft,
one in which more than one team could draft players so that each team interested could negotiate
with the player. See id. This is one proposal the MLBPA would endorse. See id. However, it
would still give too much incentive to major league teams to go out and recruit players
unlawfully. See Greller, supra note 337, at 1704. Greller proposes a draft that includes Cuban
players but not other foreign players, such as those from the Dominican Republic. See id. All
foreign players should be placed in a worldwide draft because of the documented problems that
have occurred in the Dominican Republic.
358. See supra text accompanying note 266.
359. See MLBPA Regulations Governing Player Agents art. IV, § 3(B)(12).
360. See generally 31 C.F.R. § 515.701(a)(1) (1999).
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Under this proposal, players would declare themselves eligible for the
draft by simply submitting a letter of intent and a birth certificate, when
possible, to the Major League Baseball Commissioner's Office. 361 The age
limit could then be maintained at sixteen for all foreign players because
MLB will have placed itself in a better position to regulate the age
limitation. Even if no birth certificate were available or if the one
presented was questionable, MLB officials would still be in a better
position to judge the maturity and capacity of an individual through
interviews and evaluations.
Most importantly, this proposal would potentially allow Cubans to
defect on their own, if they chose to take such a risk. The U.S.
government, with help from MLB, could intervene in appropriate
situations, after the defection has occurred. The U.S. could then grant these
players humanitarian parole, in accordance with the U.S. treaty with
Cuba.362 Most players who have defected have done so because they were
banned from Cuban baseball.363 In these instances, humanitarian parole
will be offered.364 Those who have not been banned might also be able to
receive humanitarian parole from the U.S. because it is likely if they are
returned to Cuba the players will be banned from baseball, and banned
from earning a livelihood. If the player has received humanitarian parole
pursuant to U.S. policy, then MLB could invite the player to participate in
the world-wide draft.
This proposal reduces the conflict between baseball and the U.S.
policy towards Cuban refugees. Under this proposal major league teams
would have little or no incentive to violate the Cuban embargo, and agents
would have little or no incentive to interfere with the process of players
gaining political asylum.
361. But see Major League Rule 3(a)(1)(B) (1999). "Proof of age in the form of a birth
certificate or other appropriate documentation, issued by an appropriate government agency, shall
accompany the filing of such player's first professional contract." Id. (emphasis added). This
rule should be amended such that the birth certificate is offered before the draft allowing MLB
time for a screening process because players using false documentation has been common in the
past.
362. See supra text accompanying note 283.
363. See supra text accompanying note 265. El Duque was banned from Cuban baseball.
See id.; see also Kovaleski, supra note 296. Three months after El Duque left the Bahamas, all
five players Cubas attempted to help had subsequently been banned from baseball in Cuba. See
generally id.
364. See supra text accompanying note 265.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The Dodgers violated the Cuban embargo and Major League Baseball
rules because baseball's loophole gave them an incentive to do so.
Violating the embargo undermines almost forty years of U.S. foreign
policy, and the loophole encourages agents to ignore U.S. immigration
policy for the purpose of monetary gain. The lure of money always has and
always will outweigh the risks of taking advantage of the loophole. The
damaging effect of the loophole is present and real. Nations and their
citizens are being exploited. This Comment proposes a worldwide draft as
a solution to the problem. The cost of implementing this solution is small
in comparison to the harm that has already been inflicted. Major League
Baseball needs to regain respect as America's pastime which can only be
accomplished if the Commissioner of Baseball and major league teams take
responsibility and amend their rules.
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